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INTRODUCTION
1

In Georgia v. Randolph, the U.S. Supreme Court saw new Chief Jus2
tice John Roberts’s first written dissent. In somewhat barbed lan3
guage, the Chief Justice challenged the majority’s perspective on
what properly characterized the defendant’s, and society’s, expectations of privacy. Forty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence has explicitly relied on gauging such expectations, since Justice Harlan indicated in Katz v. United States his “understanding” that “there is a
twofold requirement [in determining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection], first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
4
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” The dispute in
Randolph turned not only on the reasonableness of the defendant’s
subjective expectation of privacy, but also on the reasonableness of
society’s relatively more objective understandings of social custom
and of what might reasonably constitute an inappropriate interfer-
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5

ence in that privacy. As in most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
both Justice Souter, who wrote for the Court, and Chief Justice Roberts in dissent, made explicit psychological assumptions about perceptions and expectations of privacy, assumptions that are not neces6
sarily supported by empirical findings.
The Court’s reliance on assumptions about individuals’ and society’s expectations, perceptions, and understandings of that nebulous
notion of “privacy” highlights the importance of empirical research
7
into such understanding. As with any body of law, where psychological assumptions can be replaced—or at the very least supplemented—by psychological fact, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
can be challenged or supported, but in any case substantially enriched.
Little relevant empirical research has been conducted on percep8
tions of privacy, however, most of it by the same few researchers.
Studies have examined, for instance, perceptions of privacy in the
9
context of consent searches, the degree of intrusiveness that charac10
terizes various searches, differences between the perceptions of observers and consentors in the degree of choice the consentor had to
11
consent to a police request, differences between lay and police per-

5

6

7
8

9
10

11

Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) (noting the importance to Fourth
Amendment protection of “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society”).
Indeed, findings from nearly twenty years before Randolph show that both Justices’ current assumptions were faulty. Dorothy K. Kagehiro & Ralph B. Taylor, Third-Party Consent
Searches: Legal vs. Social Perceptions of “Common Authority,” 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1274
(1988); see also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of
Law Enforcement Searches and Seizures, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 198–99 (1993) (collecting data on lay perceptions and arguing as a result that Fourth Amendment doctrine “is
based on flawed assumptions about society’s perspective on privacy”).
Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional
Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399, 437 (2004).
Professor Chanenson characterizes such research as “meager,” a better description than
“nonexistent,” which one commentator he cites uses. See id. at 447 & n.297. The commentator there alleged that “[n]o published data currently exist on consent
searches . . . . [which] leaves a significant gap in the legal and social science literature.”
Id. As sketched below, the literature does (and did) exist—though it is lamentably sparse,
a situation we seek to help remedy here.
See Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Psycholegal Research on the Fourth Amendment, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 187
(1990) (reviewing some similar research).
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6; Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look
at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted By Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) [hereinafter
Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations].
Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Perceived Voluntariness of Consent to Warrantless Police Searches, 18 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38 (1988).
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12

ceptions of third-party consentors’ authority, or potential hindsight
13
biases in the evaluation of such third-party consent searches. However, such research has itself proceeded from only vague assumptions
about what constitutes perceptions of “privacy” in the first place. De14
spite recent efforts to organize legal understandings of privacy, both
research and case law still seem to proceed from a perception of pri15
vacy overall as “a unitary concept with a uniform value.” Even in the
context of Fourth Amendment search and seizure, privacy has been
primarily seen as unidimensional, focusing, for instance, on a broad
notion of “intrusiveness” or, consistent with doctrinal language but
using broad terms, on violations of an individual’s “expectations of
privacy.”
In the present research, however, we present a finer-grained picture of perceptions of privacy. By empirically identifying the multiple
dimensions that lay individuals use in determining whether a law enforcement official has interfered with a citizen’s privacy in the Fourth
Amendment context, we begin to unpack the different elements that
go into “reasonable” expectations of privacy. As explained below, we
present here an empirical study using the multidimensional scaling
methodology, identifying the dimensions that laypeople use in evalu16
ating “privacy.” By articulating those dimensions we are able to go
further than previous empirical research in understanding percep-
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Dorothy K. Kagehiro et al., Social Perceptions of Third-Party Consent and the Reasonableness
Test of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 217 (1992). But cf. Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 934 n.35 (2005)
(“[I]n the Fourth Amendment context, the law deems the government agents’ expectations of the plaintiff’s privacy irrelevant. Rather, the law focuses only on what the subject
of the search expected, and whether those expectations were reasonable.”).
Dorothy K. Kagehiro et al., Hindsight Bias and Third-Party Consentors to Warrantless Police
Searches, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1991).
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006) [hereinafter Solove,
Taxonomy]; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002).
Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 14, at 480. That is, to the extent there is agreement on its
scope in the first place. See id. at 479–80 (“Privacy is a chameleon-like word . . . . [It] is
vague and evanescent, protean, and suffer[s] from an embarrassment of meanings. Perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy, philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson has observed, is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)); see also Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 505 (2007) (“The Court’s handiwork has been
condemned as distressingly unmanageable, unstable, and a series of inconsistent and bizarre results that [the Court] has left entirely undefended.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)).
In ongoing studies, we experimentally manipulate the dimensions identified here in different ways to further investigate perceptions and expectations of privacy, individual differences therein, and the malleability of such perceptions.
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tions of privacy; we are able to assess the psychological validity of the
Court’s assumptions about individuals’ subjective privacy expectations, as well as those about society’s views of those perceptions. As a
result, we are able to evaluate and inform existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. We also identify areas and methods for further empirical research. In part, we hope, our research is thus a step in addressing recurring lamentations about the difficulty of identifying
17
what is considered “reasonable” in the privacy context, a step in
avoiding what some see as indeterminate and arbitrary Fourth
18
Amendment decision-making, and a step toward a fuller empirical
picture of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Randolph and Perceptions of Privacy
In Randolph, police arrived at the residence of a married but estranged couple in response to a domestic dispute. In discussion with
one of the policemen, the wife, Janet Randolph, mentioned drug use
by her husband, Scott, and volunteered that there was drug para19
phernalia in the house. When asked by the policeman for permis20
sion to search the house, Scott Randolph “unequivocally refused.”
After Scott’s refusal, the policeman asked Janet’s permission to
search the house, which she “readily gave,” and led the policeman
21
into a room she described as Scott’s bedroom. There, the policeman observed material he believed was cocaine. The policeman left
the house and contacted the local district attorney, who instructed
him to obtain a search warrant; after obtaining a warrant and returning to search the house again, police obtained drug-related items that
22
led to an indictment of Scott Randolph for drug possession.
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18

19
20
21
22

E.g., Kerr, supra note 15, at 504 (“[N]o one knows when society might opt to ‘recognize’
or ‘permit’ [an understanding]. Who is ‘society,’ and how do Supreme Court Justices
know what it thinks?”); see also ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 46
(2003) (“How do we know what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable?”).
2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 168–69 (criticizing a focus on “social expectations of privacy” as allowing judicial outcomes to depend on judicial assumptions about
those expectations, and suggesting that such “indeterminacy” leads to “instability and unpredictability”).
See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Scott Randolph’s efforts to suppress the evidence at trial were unsuccessful. Although he argued that his wife did not have authority
to consent to a search over his express refusal, the trial court ruled
that she had common authority over the house which authorized her
to consent to a search even over his refusal. State appellate courts
disagreed, however, and reversed the trial court’s ruling, emphasizing
that “the consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given
by one occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant who is physically present at the scene to permit a warrantless
23
search.”
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. Justice Souter’s opinion for the
majority turned in part on consensually held conceptions regarding
expectations of privacy. Although not always explicitly, the analysis
moved between Katz’s two features: the reasonableness of a consent
search—here, when the consent given is by a third party—derives in
24
part from an occupant’s expectations of privacy, and in part from
25
society’s understanding of the consentor’s authority to do so.
Throughout, Justice Souter appealed to “common understand26
27
ing[s],” “social practice,” “the authority recognized by customary
28
29
social usage,” and “social custom” regarding such expectations, using his understanding of such custom to buttress his assertions about
how individuals would behave in various social situations—and consequently his ruling that such understandings precluded one cooccupant from granting permission to search over the objection of
another physically present co-occupant.
To Justice Souter, this was hardly a novel approach; he asserted
that a central feature of evaluating whether a search is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment “is the great significance given to
30
widely shared social expectations” about privacy. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, disagreed. In particular, the Chief Justice objected to the majority’s assumptions about social custom, both
31
its relevance and its content. First, the dissent expressly rejected the
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 108 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 278 Ga. 614 (2004)).
Id. at 112 (reviewing expectations of tenant or hotel guest regarding landlord’s or hotel
manager’s authority to admit others over occupant’s objection).
Id. at 111; see also id. at 112 (“[N]o one would reasonably expect . . . a child
to . . . authorize anyone to rummage through his parents’ bedroom.”).
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 127–32 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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claim that those “widely shared social expectations” are an important
feature in evaluating whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth
32
Amendment.
Someone who shares ownership or occupancy of
property might expect a co-owner to behave in certain ways, in particular against third parties, but those expectations do not involve privacy—for the dissent, privacy as to that shared property has already
33
been abandoned. Thus, the Chief Justice rejected the assertion that
those social expectations played an appropriate role in Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Second, he suggested, the majority’s understanding of the substance of those expectations—regardless of their
34
relevance—was likely incorrect. Social custom may shape expectations about co-owners’ or co-occupants’ interactions and behavior,
but there was no reason to think that the majority’s perspective on
those expectations and interactions was any more correct than the
dissent’s, and thus even less reason to conform constitutional proce35
dure to them.
Both majority and dissent—though in very different ways—thus
36
focused on “social custom [and] its reflection in private law,” but
disagreed sharply over the importance of grounding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in customary perceptions of what constitutes privacy (and therefore of invasions of privacy). Importantly for present
purposes, at least part of the disagreement turned on the substance
of the Justices’ assumptions about perceptions and expectations of
privacy. Again, the focus on custom has been a recurring focus of
search-and-seizure doctrine at the very least since Katz. But again,
there has been surprisingly little empirical research into the content
of individuals’ and society’s understanding of what “privacy” comprises. Further, the previously conducted research proceeded from a
priori assumptions about how people perceive privacy, assumptions
that we seek here to evaluate empirically. That is, in helping to lay
the groundwork for an updated, more thorough empirical investiga-

32
33
34
35

36

Id. at 131.
Id.
Id. at 130 (discussing the futility of basing a constitutional rule on varying degrees of expectations due to an unlimited number of scenarios).
There are thus faint echoes in the Chief Justice’s dissent of Justice Scalia’s reluctance to
privilege public opinion (in the form, for instance, of opinion polls) in the context of
Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616–
18 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that courts are “ill-equipped” to interpret
measurements of public opinion). One might speculate whether any aspect of these
echoes supported Justice Scalia’s decision to join the Chief Justice’s dissent.
See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.
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tion into perceptions of privacy, we begin by examining the underlying features or dimensions that constitute those perceptions.
B. Previous Empirical Research
Above, we sketched—quite roughly—the doctrinal basis for
courts’ focus on psychological perceptions of and expectations about
privacy. After now briefly reviewing some of the existing empirical
research on such perceptions, we turn to a more detailed account of
our present study.
Although Katz identified the importance of insight into real-world
understandings regarding privacy and intrusions thereon, it took two
decades before research investigated those understandings empirically. Early work applied attribution theory and speech-act theory
from social psychology, investigating whether different participants in
a consent request situation might attribute acquiescence differently.
In particular, consistent with attribution theory, consentors might attribute any consent given to a perceived coercive nature of the situation, while observers—e.g., judges—might attribute consent disposi37
tionally, that is, to the actor giving consent. Consistent with speechact theory, consentors might perceive their freedom to deny an official request differently based on its phrasing; for instance, more perceived freedom when the request was phrased interrogatively (“May I
38
come in?”) than when phrased declaratively (“I am coming in.”). In
empirical tests, both of these hypotheses were supported, suggesting
to the researcher that in the context of suppression hearings, a judge
might inaccurately assess the defendant’s understanding of the situation, his intent, and his perceptions of coercion, and thus be more
39
likely to rule particular evidence admissible.
Subsequent research by that researcher and her colleagues exam40
ined perceptions close to the Randolph circumstances. Kagehiro and
Taylor noted a jurisdictional split as of 1988 regarding consent authority as to a shared residence, and tested lay perceptions of the
“common authority” identified in Matlock as necessary for validating a
co-occupant’s consent to search the shared residence when the other
resident was present or absent—that is, whether joint consent was
necessary under such circumstances. In their study, when the co-

37
38
39
40

Kagehiro, supra note 11, at 40.
Id.
See Kagehiro, supra note 9, at 189 (reviewing this research).
Kagehiro & Taylor, supra note 6.
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resident was described as absent, subjects saw the present occupant as
41
more authorized to allow a law enforcement official to enter and to
search common areas (e.g., a dining area) than when the co-resident
42
was present and protested. However, that authorization did not extend to more personal domains of the other resident, such as his
bedroom, or a personal container in the bedroom, or even in a com43
mon area. Thus, lay perceptions of such common authority were
more nuanced than either opinion in Randolph might suggest.
Such nuance in one sense supports the Chief Justice’s point that
the different situations that might be presented to a potential consentor are quite varied, undercutting the majority’s broad claim about
44
social custom. But the psychological assumptions underlying his rebuttal to the majority also seem flawed; for instance, in the same
study, the researchers examined the very privacy that the Chief Jus45
tice discussed. In addition to asking subjects whether an occupant
could grant permission to someone else to enter and/or search, the
researchers asked whether that occupant could in fact search and examine the bedroom or the personal container. Contrary to the Chief
Justice’s doctrine-based assertion that the owner of the bedroom or
46
container “has given up his privacy with respect to his roommate,”
47
subjects presumed that the occupant had virtually no right to do so.
Subsequent refinement of this third-party consent research varied
the identity of the third-party consentor, presenting a range of experimental vignette conditions to both undergraduates and law enforcement officials (detectives from the Philadelphia Police Depart48
ment).
Undergraduate perceptions of consent reasonableness—
and, surprisingly, those of detectives—differed from that which
courts would tend to approve: both students and detectives tended to
approve of third-party consent only when the third party seemed to
41

42

43
44

45
46
47
48

The researchers also varied the identity of the individual requesting permission to enter
and/or search: in different experimental conditions the “intruder” was a friend, a repairman, a housing inspector, or a police officer. See Kagehiro, supra note 9, at 190. The
different identities did not seem to affect the results. Id. at 191.
This seems consistent with Matlock. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7
(1974) (noting a co-inhabitant’s assumption of the risk that another inhabitant might
“permit [a] common area to be searched”).
Kagehiro & Taylor, supra note 6.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 130 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The possible
scenarios are limitless, and slight variations in the fact pattern yield vastly different expectations about whether the invitee might be expected to enter or to go away.”).
Id. at 131.
Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984)).
Kagehiro & Taylor, supra note 6.
Kagehiro et al., supra note 12.
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have both a high degree of social intimacy (e.g., a co-resident versus
an interior housepainter) and a high degree of “place control” (e.g.,
a mutual friend hired to housepainter versus a weekend guest, or the
friend of the consentor; but not the suspect). Courts, in contrast,
49
tend to focus less on social intimacy and more on place control.
Despite calls for “continued empirical exploration of the basic
50
tenets” of search and seizure law, little such investigation followed.
51
One legal scholar with Fourth Amendment expertise investigated lay
perceptions of the “intrusiveness” of different types of conduct by law
52
Emphasizing the relevance of community
enforcement officials.
values not only to expectations of privacy, but also to perceptions of
intrusiveness, Slobogin and Schumacher asked subjects to rank the
intrusiveness of fifty different examples of police conduct taken primarily from Supreme Court and other federal case law. Building on
the research by Kagehiro and colleagues outlined above, they expected to find a disconnect between lay perceptions and black letter
53
law. Their results were both consistent with and divergent from
Fourth Amendment doctrine. First, their respondents considered
several types of conduct that the Court would subject to heightened
scrutiny to be relatively intrusive. They also considered certain conduct that the Court would deem less objectionable to be relatively un54
intrusive. But except at these relatively clear extremes, there appeared to be strong disagreement with existing case law over the
degree to which certain conduct violates expectations of privacy. For

49
50
51

52
53

54

See Kagehiro, supra note 9, at 191.
Id. at 192.
See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1991); see also CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(1993).
See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6; Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 10.
In this, they reflect other research in the criminal law context that compares lay perceptions to doctrine and discusses the implications of disparities between the two. E.g., PAUL
H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME (1995) (comparing lay
perceptions of appropriateness of guilt and punishment across a number of different
criminal scenarios with guilt and punishment as assigned by the Model Penal Code). For
a critical discussion of such work, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Who Decides? Privileging Public Sentiment About Justice and the Substantive Law, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter
Blumenthal, Who Decides?]. Similar work has recently been conducted examining lay perceptions of the seriousness of crimes. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1866–90 (2007). For a discussion and development of that work, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime: A
Multidimensional Analysis with Implications for Law and Psychology, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 629
(2007) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime].
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 187–90.
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instance, subjects rated several types of conduct intrusive that the
Court has ruled do not involve substantial expectations of privacy,
such as the use of hypodermic needles and urine samples to test for
55
drug use. Similarly, subjects rated as intrusive certain conduct that
the Court has ruled were not even “searches” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, such as dog sniffs, entry into privately owned
“open fields,” and boarding a bus and asking passengers to consent to
56
a search of their luggage.
The authors developed three hypotheses to explain their results:
the “inference of guilt” theory, where searches and seizures of people
who appear guilty are ranked less intrusive than ones of people who
57
appear innocent ; the “dangerousness” theory, where perceived intrusiveness varies inversely with the perceived dangerousness of the
58
suspected activity ; and the “implied consent” theory, where perceived intrusiveness varies inversely with the protective motivation of
59
the searchers. As the authors pointed out, only the third is consistent with the values underlying Fourth Amendment doctrine. To the
extent that judges ruling on admissibility focus on a defendant’s perceived guilt or dangerousness—as did Slobogin and Schumacher’s
60
subjects—too much evidence might be ruled admissible. Our present study helps assess whether these factors are ones that laypeople
consider when evaluating notions of “privacy.”
Finally, the most recent empirical investigation involved archival
research into rates at which consent was given in the context of Ohio
61
traffic stops. The author, Lichtenberg, first found that a substantial
majority of those stopped (89%) consented to a search, with about
62
13% of searches resulting in drugs being found. Further, he took
advantage of the fact that the time period studied crossed the date of
the Ohio Supreme Court’s State v. Robinette decision, in which that

55
56
57
58
59
60

61

62

Id. at 190.
Id.
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 194.
See id. at 195–96. This concern is consistent with findings that observers are subject to the
hindsight bias in evaluating consent. See Kagehiro et al., supra note 13 (demonstrating
this point empirically); cf. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77
VA. L. REV. 881 (1991) (making a similar point).
See Chanenson, supra note 7, at 451–55 (summarizing study by Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry into the “Consensual” PoliceCitizen Encounter (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file
with author)). We do not discuss here the literature on racial profiling and traffic stops.
See Chanenson, supra note 7, at 452.
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court ruled that consent to search could only be requested once an
63
individual was told that she was free to leave the situation.
He
found, however, that Robinette did not seem to have a substantial ef64
The most notable finding seemed to
fect on compliance rates.
combine these two results. That is, Lichtenberg argued that individuals provided consent almost exclusively because they were afraid
of the consequences if they refused; he also observed that most individuals reported not knowing that they in fact had a legal right to re65
fuse. This appears consistent with critics of consent doctrine who
argue that formalistic search requests made by law enforcement officials may be construed by suspects quite differently from the way the
66
Supreme Court presumes. Although there are a number of caveats
to and inferences made from the study, again, this seems to indicate a
gap in the Court’s assumptions about the way real people think and
act in the real world, emphasizing the need for more such information and research.
C. Present Study
Taken together, this small body of empirical research on consent
and perceptions or expectations of privacy documents that gap, suggesting that lay perceptions in fact differ from Supreme Court doctrine—at times substantially. But that research itself begins from a
priori assumptions about such perceptions that themselves have not
been fully examined—for instance, that there is consensus about
what is meant by “privacy,” even if that consensus is articulated with
67
difficulty. To take privacy as a unitary concept with a uniform val68
ue may be to operate at too high a level of abstraction, giving rise to
the sort of indeterminacy and arbitrariness decried by commentators.
Efforts to taxonomize types and notions of privacy are an important
step in parsing what is meant by privacy, but these particular recent
efforts focus on description and categorization, trying to make sense
69
of existing doctrine. A complementary approach is the empirical
63
64
65
66

67
68
69

State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
See Chanenson, supra note 7, at 452–53.
Id. at 454 (quoting Lichtenberg, supra note 61).
See, e.g., Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q.
175, 187–90 (observing the extent to which the authoritative presence of police officers
influences consent); William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213,
1215 (1998) (noting the varied application of the Terry reasonable suspicion standard).
See supra notes 14–15.
Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 15, at 480.
Id.; Kerr, supra note 15.
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one we take here, focusing on lay perceptions of what constitutes privacy and thus violations of privacy. Our efforts here are closest to
Slobogin and Schumacher’s approach, but we expand upon their
work in a number of ways.
First, their research was published in 1993, and it may thus be useful to examine whether, and the extent to which, expectations of privacy have changed. Especially in the post-9/11-reform atmosphere of
legislative and media attention to government incursion into individuals’ private lives, there is a very real possibility that such expectations may differ from over a decade ago. Second, Slobogin and
Schumacher focused only on one variable, “intrusiveness,” which—
though suggested by doctrine—might itself be overly broad. Although they present interesting possibilities for factors subjects may
70
have considered in interpreting that variable, the methodology they
selected constrained them to evaluate their stimuli across only one
dimension. Accordingly, third, in examining perceptions and expectations of privacy, we used multidimensional scaling (“MDS”), a
methodology explicitly designed to help identify underlying factors
or dimensions that constitute broader variables, rather than focusing
on ranking stimuli along a variable selected a priori.
More specifically, by thus working in a “bottom-up” rather than
“top-down” fashion, MDS is a procedure that helps researchers uncover “hidden structures” in existing data by graphically plotting respondents’ perceptions of perceived similarities (or dissimilarities)
71
among various stimuli. When these stimuli are located on a plot
based on such perceptions, underlying dimensions that respondents
72
may have used (consciously or not) can be inferred. For instance,
subjects might be asked to rate the similarity of countries in the
world, and a plot made of those similarity rankings. The resulting
plot might look like a map of the world. This could suggest that subjects were implicitly or explicitly using dimensions involving distance
or direction—in particular, dimensions of north/south and
east/west. But the plot might line up the stimuli on a single axis going from largest to smallest, or most to least economically developed,
or most to least familiar, or even alphabetical, suggesting that subjects
used that single dimension in rating and organizing the countries.
Inferring which dimension is important to respondents helps under-

70
71
72

See supra notes 57–59.
Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime, supra note 53, at 632.
JOSEPH B. KRUSKAL & MYRON WISH, MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING 5–10 (1978).
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stand the way in which they see the world (in this example, literally),
73
and what factors are important to them.
Finally, by also obtaining explicit ratings of the stimuli on previously selected dimensions, we can also statistically correlate ratings on
the inferred dimensions with the explicit ratings, in order to examine
the degree of fit there. Dimensions we identify can be manipulated
experimentally or otherwise examined further in subsequent re74
search.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Materials and Administration
With continuity and consistency in mind, we used the stimuli from
Slobogin and Schumacher’s studies, along with one additional stimu75
lus reflecting the Randolph fact pattern. Each stimulus was a sentence summarizing the search at issue in a particular case. All testing
76
was conducted over the Internet though a secure connection. Participants saw stimuli presented in pairs on the screen and rated how
similar they felt each pair of stimuli were using a seven-point scale
(1 = Extremely Dissimilar; 7 = Extremely Similar). Participants were
instructed to rate how similar they felt the scenarios were, “however
they wanted.” Stimulus scenarios were randomly assigned to three
different lists of seventeen items each to minimize fatigue and participant burden. The shortened lists resulted in similarity ratings of
136 pairwise comparisons. Additionally, two versions of each list were
created: one included a parenthetical describing the context or target of the search, while the other did not (see Table 1 in Appendix
77
for examples). Within each list, scenario pairs were presented in a
single pseudo-random order where terms were equally spaced

73
74
75
76
77

Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime, supra note 53; see also supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
See supra note 16.
See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6; Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 10. A complete list of stimuli appears in Table 1.
The research was approved by the relevant institutional review board and complied with
the ethical research guidelines of the American Psychological Association.
This manipulation reflected Slobogin and Schumacher’s hypothesis that providing raters
with a specific objective for a search or seizure would lead to lower perceived “intrusiveness,” because the search or seizure would seem more justified. Slobogin & Schumacher,
supra note 6, at 184–85.
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throughout the presentation. Following the similarity ratings, scenarios were presented a second time and participants rated each scenario on objective intrusiveness using a five-point scale (1 = Not at
All; 5 = Extremely).
After reading a description of the study and providing informed
consent, participants were presented with the instructions for the first
task. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six lists: first
to one of the three lists of scenarios, and then to either the context or
no-context version of that particular list.
B. Participants
One hundred fifty-nine subjects participated. All were undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course (mean education level was sophomore year), and received partial course credit
in exchange for their participation. Fifty-five percent of the sample
was female, and the group was 70% Caucasian. Ages ranged from 19
to 27 (mean age = 20, s.d. = 1.08).
Thirty-five percent of the sample self-identified as Democrats, 24%
identified themselves as Republicans, 14% reported being Independents, and 1% identified themselves as Libertarians. Twenty-six percent of participants chose not to report their political affiliation.
Seven participants indicated that they were citizens of countries other
than the United States, and these individuals were excluded from
analyses on the basis that different political systems or cultures may
79
alter views of privacy-related situations.
III. RESULTS
In this Part, we present the results of our MDS and other statistical
analyses. First, we briefly describe dependent variables based on subjects’ background characteristics and discuss the effects of those
demographics on dependent variables. Second, we demonstrate the
multidimensional nature of subjects’ judgments about the privacyrelated stimuli, identifying multiple different but related dimensions
in the relationships underlying those judgments. Finally, we discuss
the influence of providing subjects with contextual information about
each stimulus (in the form of a brief parenthetical describing the
78
79

Robert T. Ross, Optimum Orders for the Presentation of Pairs in the Method of Paired Comparisons, 25 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 375 (1934).
Two participants indicated previous training in law-related fields; however, these individuals were not excluded from the analyses.
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purpose of the search). In Part IV, we more fully discuss these results’ implications and extend the discussion to further research.
A. Descriptives
Although subjects rated the objective intrusiveness of each stimulus after rating the similarities of all scenarios, we present those rating
data here first. As did Slobogin and Schumacher, we present in Table 1 the subjects’ overall rankings, as well as the mean and standard
deviation of the subjects’ ratings, for all stimuli. For comparison
purposes, Table 1 also displays Slobogin and Schumacher’s subjects’
80
rankings, as well as their means and standard deviations. Our subjects’ intrusiveness ratings are quite consistent with their results; each
81
of our samples correlated highly with their overall data.
In addition to the demographic data described above in Part II.B,
we collected descriptive data on the following dependent variables:
current place of residence, number of hours spent watching television, and political views. Residence might have affected the subjects’
expectations of privacy depending on the degree of autonomy they
perceived as a result of shared or individual residency, or as a result
82
of home-ownership or rental status. Television watching may have
affected responses as a result of culturally-induced perceptions of
what is acceptable law enforcement conduct. Finally, different political orientations might implicate different perceptions of the value of
privacy and autonomy, and the consequent appropriateness of law
83
enforcement intervention.
80
81

82

83

See Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 10, at 738–39 tbl.1.
The samples correlated with their overall ratings as follows: Sample 1, R(17) = 0.81,
P < 0.001; Sample 2, R(17) = 0.60, P = 0.011; Sample 3, R(16) = 0.84, P < 0.001; Sample 4,
R(17) = 0.75, P = 0.001; Sample 5, R(17) = 0.58, P = 0.014; Sample 6, R(16) = 0.83,
P < 0.001.
Note, however, that although we distinguished between contextualized and noncontextualized ratings, their reported data collapse across all their experimental conditions, including context/no context. Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 10, at 737. Thus, we highlight the consistency between our studies, although the
tables and rankings are not perfectly comparable.
Cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“In [areas] intimately linked to the
home, both physically and psychologically, . . . privacy expectations are most heightened.”); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, “To Be Human”: A Psychological Perspective on Property Law,
83 TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (discussing psychological perceptions of and relating to “home”).
Slobogin and Schumacher also examined political orientation in the context of due
process/crime control orientations. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 186. They
found, in part, that subjects who agreed more strongly with due process values tended to
rate scenarios as more intrusive. Id. at 187, 196–97.
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Of the 159 participants, 79% reported living in the campus dorms,
approximately 16% reported renting an apartment, 4% reported living with their parents, and 1% reported owning their own home.
One hundred and five participants reported watching less than two
hours of television per day, 41 reported watching between two and
four hours of television per day, and the final 13 reported watching
between four and eight hours of television per day. However, there
were no statistically significant differences in intrusiveness ratings for
84
any of the scenarios based on the descriptive or demographic data.
B. Multidimensionality
Participants made similarity ratings of all possible pairs of stimuli.
Again, these similarity ratings are thought to reflect the implicit cog85
nitive structure participants are imposing on the stimuli. As alluded
to in the Introduction, multidimensional scaling (“MDS”) then allows
researchers to uncover “hidden structures” or patterns in the data.
MDS is similar to factor analysis in that it extracts underlying patterns; however, these patterns are represented as dimensions in a visual plot rather than statistical factors. MDS statistically extracts n dimensions and produces fit values at each level of n to help determine
which n is the best fit for the data—that is, how many dimensions best
represent the data. Traditional indices of fit were employed here:
86
2
Kruskal’s stress index and R . For Kruskal’s stress index, lower val2
87
ues indicate better fit; for R , higher values indicate better fit. Stress
values were graphed to create scree plots for each of the stimuli sets
88
2
(see Figure 1 in Appendix), and R values appear in Table 2. As
2
demonstrated by these scree plots and by the R values, the optimal
solution for these data consistently yielded three dimensions; that is,

84
85

86
87

88

Tests were based on significance at the P = .05 level. Precise values for these test results
are available from the authors.
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text (noting that plotting various stimuli based
on respondents’ perceptions allows for the inference of underlying dimensions, which
helps understand the way respondents view the world); see also Roger N. Shephard, Toward a Universal Law of Generalization for Psychological Science, 237 SCI. 1317 (1987).
See J.B. Kruskal, Multidimensional Scaling By Optimizing Goodness of Fit to a Nonmetric Hypothesis, 29 PSYCHOMETRIKA 1 (1964) (developing a definition of the stress index).
See Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime, supra note 53 (describing stress as a measure of the
2
badness of fit and R as a measure of goodness of fit); cf. Mark L. Davison & Stephen G. Sireci, Multidimensional Scaling, in HANDBOOK OF APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS AND
MATHEMATICAL MODELING 323, 335 (Howard E.A. Tinsley & Steven D. Brown eds., 2000)
(explaining stress as “an index of the mismatch” between the MDS distances and the data).
See Davison & Sireci, supra note 87, at 336.
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for every sample, solutions with more than three dimensions did not
result in substantial decreases in stress, or in substantial increases in
2
R . For clarity, Figures 2 through 7 display these three dimensions in
two-dimensional form; each figure thus has three sub-parts, (a)
89
through (c), plotting each dimension against each of the others.
Unsurprisingly, interpretation of MDS plots involves both qualitative and quantitative factors and both objective and subjective interpretation. Most intuitively, researchers can inspect the resulting plots
visually, focusing on “whether the dimension is ordering the stimuli
according to some continuous stimulus characteristic, or grouping
90
stimuli according to a discrete characteristic.” Thus, in our discussion here we highlight comparisons of stimuli located at different
ends of the plotted dimensions, as well as similarities in the grouping
of stimuli at particular coordinates. We recognize that our interpretations—like most initial MDS interpretations—are “primarily subjec91
tive,” and look to our ongoing research to test the dimensions’ robustness. Our important points here are to demonstrate that lay
perceptions of privacy are multidimensional and that providing context affects subjects’ judgments.
Nevertheless, we are able to infer dimensions from these plots, reflecting the cognitive rules subjects used to distinguish among the
stimuli. Again, the best-fitting solution for each sample has three dimensions, although they differ among the non-contextualized samples (Samples 1 through 3). In Samples 1 and 2 (Figures 2 and 3),
the three that appear are person vs. property; type of action constituting
the search; and intrusiveness. In Sample 3, the type of action dimension
appears to be replaced by one reflecting degree of permission, that is, a
judgment about “to what degree would one have permission to do
92
such a search?”
Our inferences about these dimensions stem from the way in
which clusters of stimuli fall along them. Specifically, for the person/property dimension from Samples 1 through 3, the endpoints are
represented by stimuli such as “body cavity search,” “dog sniff,” and
“going through magnetometer” at one end, and “search of a newspaper office,” “perusing bank records,” and “looking through burned-

89
90
91
92

As we discuss further in the next subsection, providing context made a difference in subjects’ responses and in the dimensional plots that these responses yielded.
See Davison & Sireci, supra note 87, at 337.
Id. at 339.
Note the degree to which this perceived implicit dimension tracks the ultimate legal question.
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down house” at the other. For these same samples, the intrusiveness
dimension has similar stimuli at its endpoints, though additional
stimuli (e.g., “rummaging through suitcase” and “searching footlocker”) that clustered with other property stimuli suggests the perception of intrusiveness by participants along that dimension. As noted
above, the second dimension did not appear consistent across Samples 1 through 3. For the first two samples, the dimension regarding
the type of action seemed apparent from clusters along the endpoints
that included similar stimuli as the first dimension, though the
spread is different. Thus, while the first dimension seems to be more
cleanly represented by a judgment about “what are they searching?
My person or my property?,” the third dimension seems more cleanly
represented by a judgment about “what are they doing while searching? Looking, rummaging, touching?” In Sample 3 (Figure 4), the
permission dimension seemed apparent from a cluster of stimuli such
as “reading a personal diary” and “surrounded by a fence and no trespassing signs” at one end and “searching a jail cell” and “searching
bedroom of probationer.”
However, providing context had an important effect on the way
subjects distinguished among stimuli. The two dimensions reflecting
person/property and intrusiveness seem to replicate in the contextualized
samples. However, a prominent dimension across Samples 4 through
6 (Figures 5 through 7) reflects the seriousness of the crime that provided the basis for the search, consistent with Slobogin and
93
Schumacher’s “dangerousness” theory. That dimension seems to
replace or supersede the shifting “type of action” or “permission” dimensions identified in the non-contextualized samples above. Our
inferences for the replicating dimensions are based on stimuli that
cluster along the ends of the dimension in groupings similar to those
described above for the no context samples. Our inferences about
the seriousness dimension reflect endpoints involving “armed robbery”
and “stolen car parts” at the more serious endpoint, and “drunkenness” and “damage to residence” at the less serious endpoint, with
more moderately serious crimes at midpoints along that dimension.
C. Context and Perceptions of Intrusiveness
Moreover, recall Slobogin and Schumacher’s hypothesis that context would influence respondents’ ratings of intrusiveness. Specifically, they suggested that providing raters with a specific objective for
93

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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a search or seizure would lead to lower perceived “intrusiveness,” because the search or seizure would seem more justified. They re94
ported that the hypothesis was confirmed, and suggested this leads
to negative policy implications because evaluators will “systematically
95
underestimate the intrusiveness” of a search or seizure.
However, some caveats attach to Slobogin and Schumacher’s results. First, purely as a statistical matter, the results they reported do
96
not clearly match the hypothesis they tested. Second, their data
suggested that providing context mattered, but in different ways for
97
different searches. For example, in some instances describing the
goal of the search led to lower ratings of intrusiveness consistent with
their prediction, but in other instances, context in fact increased intrusiveness ratings. Third, although they inferred that lower intrusiveness ratings with context are “underestimations,” they simply assumed a priori that the non-contextualized ratings were the
98
appropriate normative baseline.
To more closely address the question of context, we manipulated
that variable as well. Our data also revealed provocative patterns in
terms of context.
We found high correlations between overall intrusiveness ratings
99
of stimuli in samples with and without context, RSample1-Sample4 = 0.84,
P < 0.001; RSample2-Sample5 = 0.74, P = 0.001; RSample3-Sample6 = 0.97, P < 0.001.
Superficially, this might suggest that context had no effect on ratings.

94
95
96

97
98

99

Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 187.
Id. at 191.
Slobogin and Schumacher reported a diffuse F-test, testing four experimental conditions.
The result they reported, showing no difference between “evidence” and “no evidence”
conditions, would have required a focused test between those two conditions only. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 187. They apparently reported a test across all four
of their subject samples—leading to a diffuse F-test with three degrees of freedom in the
numerator—where the more precise test of their context hypothesis would combine all
four samples, leading to a focused F-test with one degree of freedom in the numerator.
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 191–95.
The authors argue that post hoc evaluations are more likely than non-contextualized
evaluations to be “incorrect” because case law calls for taking the perspective of an “innocent” defendant. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (stating that “the ‘reasonable person’ test presupposes an innocent person”). The explanations they give for
their data rely in part, however, on the evaluators’ assumptions that the defendant is
more likely than not guilty. Moreover, although this is a correct statement of case law,
the Bostick Court was making a different point: rather than emphasizing the evaluator’s
belief or assumption of defendant’s guilt, the Court was stating that the degree of intrusiveness should be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable innocent person. See id.
We discuss this issue further infra at notes 111 through 113 and accompanying text.
Recall that Samples 1, 2, and 3 did not include context; Samples 4, 5, and 6 were identical
to 1, 2, and 3, respectively, but provided context.
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But examining the results more closely indicates a number of clear
differences between the contextualized and non-contextualized samples.
First, the dimensions we identified in the best-fitting solution are
100
inconsistently correlated across samples. That is, in comparing the
dimensions the MDS solution identifies across samples, some are correlated and some are not; and those that are correlated, are not correlated in each sample. Dimension 1, for instance, correlates highly
between Samples 1 and 4 (R = 0.90, P < 0.001) and 2 and 5 (R = 0.69,
P = 0.002), but not between Samples 3 and 6 (R = 0.31, P = 0.23).
The contextualized Dimension 2, on the other hand, is uncorrelated
with its non-contextualized counterpart across all samples (R’s
ranged between 0.06 and 0.35, P’s between 0.17 and 0.81). Dimension 3, like Dimension 1, varied across samples: correlated significantly between Samples 1 and 4 (R = -0.58, P = 0.015); uncorrelated
between Samples 2 and 5 (R = 0.13, P = 0.62), and Samples 3 and 6
(R = 0.13, P = 0.63).
Thus, the dimensions identified differ substantially with and without context, as shown in Figures 2 through 7. Such inconsistent correlations might be expected from dimensions that are related but not
the same (i.e., that tap different aspects or features of the same
broad, overarching construct). And again, at least two dimensions
seem to repeat across samples, though the third varies in the noncontextualized samples and changes in the contextualized samples.
Second, again as might be expected, the stimuli cluster together
quite differently with and without context, as illustrated more extensively in Tables 3–5. Third, such a nuanced effect of context is consistent with earlier findings. Slobogin and Schumacher found that
context mattered, but inconsistently; sometimes it elevated subjects’
101
intrusiveness ratings, sometimes it decreased those ratings. Our data shows similar patterns.
Specifically, we conducted a multivariate analyses of variance
(“MANOVA”) on each of the three context/no-context sample pairs
examining whether there was an effect of the independent variable
context on multiple dependent variables (i.e., ratings of each stimulus). As shown in Table 1, for almost every stimulus (43 of 51), pro-

100

101

Of course, these dimensions are not necessarily identical to the ones we infer above; rather, they simply reflect the way the plots display subjects’ perceptions of the similarity of
the stimuli. Our analysis here demonstrates that these perceptions change when context
is provided.
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 191–95; see also id. at 187.
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viding context led to a decrease in absolute intrusiveness ratings. In
ten of those instances the decrease was statistically significant below
the P = 0.05 level; in an additional four, the decrease was significant
below the P = 0.10 level. These more focused findings are shown in
Table 6.
IV. DISCUSSION
We highlight here three useful contributions from the present
study: the utility of our methodological approach; substantive doctrinal implications for Fourth Amendment law and policy; and implications for further research.
A. Methodological
Multidimensional scaling is a valuable methodology for digging
more deeply into individual judgments about concepts and constructs; at its broadest, it is useful in any context in which similarities
among stimuli may be of interest or in which we are interested in understanding what the basis might be for people’s judgments or perceptions. Here, we used the approach to decompose people’s perceptions of “privacy” and violations of privacy. Rather than simply
103
examining privacy as a “unitary concept with a uniform value,” we
confirmed that it is a multifactor construct, best thought of as reflecting three different, albeit related, dimensions. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of not looking at such broad concepts as unidimensional, and not focusing solely on one variable (such as
“intrusiveness”) in seeking to capture understandings of the concepts. If nothing else, taking this approach helps broaden the toolbox of empirical legal studies. More profitably though, it helps elucidate researchers’ understandings of how individuals see “privacy,”
and can help courts and policymakers in fashioning Fourth Amendment doctrine.

102

103

These findings are consistent with—and, indeed, stronger than—Slobogin and Schumacher’s predictions.
The following stimuli showed an increase in absolute intrusiveness ratings when context was provided: following pedestrian in police car, looking at foliage in public park,
flying 400 yards over backyard in helicopter, search of house over husband’s objection
when wife gives consent, shining flashlight down dark alley next to home, searching jail
cell, pat-down at border, and searching bedroom of probationer. Of these, only flying
400 yards over backyard in helicopter increased ratings at a significant level, R = -0.27,
P = 0.047.
Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 14, at 480.
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B. Substantive
Specifically, our findings of multidimensionality and context effects have substantive implications. First, despite the Court’s apparent focus on broad constructs such as “intrusiveness” or “expectations
of privacy,” it is clear that those broad concepts subsume more specific, narrower ones that influence how each broad concept is perceived. Proponents might emphasize the flexibility inherent in such
104
broad concepts.
Importantly, however, these narrower features
likely vary substantially across cases and fact patterns, and can lead to
quite different expectations of privacy on the part of the target of the
search, as well as different understandings of those expectations on
the evaluator’s part. To the extent that additional research indicates
that such narrower features are emphasized differently and systematically by different groups—i.e., the target of the search, the conductor
of the search, and the evaluators of the search’s appropriateness—
courts and policymakers may need to address whether legal standards
105
should accommodate these different emphases. Depending on the
privilege to be accorded lay intuitions, it might be that the Court’s
standard for judging “reasonable expectations of privacy” will need
refinement in order to account for changes depending on certain
facts of the case, characteristics of the actors in a case, or characteristics of reviewers of the case.
Second, the attention subjects paid to the “seriousness” of the
crime, leading to the dimension identified in Samples 4 through 6, is
worthy of note. Slobogin and Schumacher posited a similar feature—
the “dangerousness” of criminal activity—to explain some of their
106
findings.
For them, “to the extent an intrusiveness rating is based
on the . . . fear of the criminal activity investigated, it should be invalid for Fourth Amendment purposes[, and] . . . . should not normally
107
affect measurement of the action’s insult to privacy or autonomy.”
That is, at a doctrinal level, an unjustified warrantless search of a bedroom is equally intrusive whether the object of the search is a crack
pipe, counterfeit money, or a dirty bomb in a suitcase. Similarly, an
unjustified pat down should be equally unacceptable whether on the

104

105
106
107

Cf. Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93
(2002) (arguing, in an eminent domain context, that doctrinal “vagueness” allows for
flexibility when appropriate).
Cf. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009).
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 195.
Id.
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street or at an airport, regardless of the National Threat Level. Our
subjects’ focus (and that of Slobogin and Schumacher’s subjects) on
the seriousness or dangerousness of the criminal activity in question,
however, might suggest that they do not share that perspective, and
that the purpose of a search justifiably plays a role in evaluating it—
108
typically leading to lower perceived intrusiveness.
The Court has
certainly acknowledged a long-standing doctrine allowing “exigent
circumstances” to justify otherwise inappropriate searches. This doctrine has been narrowly construed, however, typically applied under
circumstances that might lead to the destruction of evidence. Moreover, the Court has expressly rejected the idea that “the seriousness
of the offense under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances
of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless
109
search.”
As in the example above, if further research bears out
these findings, there will be an important disconnect between blackletter law and lay perceptions. In this and other research in the criminal law context, such disconnect can occasion substantial debate
over its consequences: to the extent the two perspectives differ,
110
which should change?
Third, we found, consistent with Slobogin and Schumacher, that
when the context of a search is provided—typically information about
the crime under investigation, or perhaps the evidence or information sought—the search is evaluated differently. In our sample, even
more than in those researchers’, ratings of intrusiveness decreased
when such information was provided.
Those researchers saw such context effects as troubling, suggesting that they could lead to courts and law enforcement officials un111
derestimating the degree of intrusiveness of a particular search.
However, as noted above, it is not clear a priori that evaluators are
necessarily underestimating intrusiveness; it could be that noncontextualized judgments might be overestimating intrusiveness. That
is, Slobogin and Schumacher assumed that the abstract judgment was
the correct one as both a doctrinal and a psychological matter. Doc-

108
109

110
111

See Table 6.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). Under a related doctrine, the “knock-andannounce rule,” a dangerous situation may constitute exigent circumstances. E.g., Wilson
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995). Under Mincey, however, that does not appear to be
the case under the “expectations of privacy” approach.
Compare ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 53, with Blumenthal, Who Decides?, supra note 53.
See also Kahan et al., supra note 105.
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 191.
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trinally, that may not be so ; psychologically, it is not clear that there
are explicit grounds for making such a choice.
Moreover, in practice, such context effects may be of less import,
because judges will always be presented with context in making their
decisions, whether issuing a warrant or ruling on admissibility. Outside of court, however, the context effects might be of more relevance. In setting policy, for instance, legislation about the scope of
law enforcement authority to conduct searches would be framed in
the abstract—that is, in non-contextualized terms—but would thus be
seen as more intrusive. However, when a search is actually conducted
under such authority, the context will lead to it being perceived as
less intrusive. Invasive conduct may thus be seen as less so in prac113
tice, a circumstance both salutary and discomfiting. That is, it may
be comforting that apparently broad search authority might be seen
as more acceptable when the purpose of the search is understood or
placed in context; on the other hand, this is precisely what concerns
contemporary civil rights advocates: the idea that justifying such authority in one way can lead to that power being broadened beyond its
appropriate scope. Clearly, this issue as well is one for further discussion and research, both normative and empirical.
CONCLUSION
Recent theoretical work has sought to articulate a descriptive
framework for the Court’s privacy decisions and privacy scholarship
114
overall, and for Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure doctrine in
115
particular. The empirical approach taken here expands upon such
theoretical work. Although the present data are preliminary, they set
the stage for a research agenda that develops our understandings of
“expectations of privacy” from an empirical perspective, elaborating
116
and providing insight into Fourth Amendment doctrine.

112
113

114
115
116

See supra note 98.
As just one example from the present data, note the drop of almost 1.5 points (on only a
five-point scale) when “pat-down” is instead presented as “pat-down (at airport after terrorist threat).” See Table 1.
See supra note 14.
Kerr, supra note 15.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Overall Ratings of Intrusiveness of Stimuli, with Slobogin and
Schumacher Data for Comparison.
STIMULUS
(context)
Looking in
foliage at
public park
(murder
weapon)
Searching a
coal mine
(safety violations)
Shining
flashlight
down dark
alley next to
home (drug
transaction)
Going
through
magnetometer at airport
(weapons)
Inspecting
plumbing
and wiring
of residence
(damage)
Flying 400
yards over
backyard in
helicopter
(marijuana)
Searching
jail cell (evidence of
conspiracy)
Hospital
surgery on
shoulder
(bullet)
Inspecting
exterior of
car in public
lot (blood
stains)
Dog sniff of
body
(drugs)

WITHOUT
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

WITH
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

S&S
M (SD)
(scale:
0–100)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

2

1.61 (0.96)

1.67 (0.87)

51

6.48
(15.74)

50

2

1.96 (1.04)

1.83 (1.09)

50

52.17
(35.35)

35

3

1.96 (1.04)

2.41 (1.37)

49

18.33
(25.64)

48

1

2.00 (1.07)

1.59 (0.80)

48

13.47
(18.74)

49

1

2.41 (1.15)

1.63 (1.08)

47

42.51
(30.25)

40

2

2.50 (1.43)

3.29 (1.37)

46

40.32
(30.44)

41

3

2.50 (1.29)

2.70 (1.17)

45

30.63
(27.87)

45

2

2.68 (1.61)

1.92 (1.50)

44

74.17
(30.06)

11

2

2.71 (1.12)

2.00 (1.02)

43

19.46
(21.98)

47

1

2.83 (1.31)

2.78 (1.34)

42

58.33
(31.58)

28

SAMPLE
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STIMULUS
(context)
Questioning
on public
sidewalk for
10 minutes
(determine
destination)
Stopping all
drivers at roadblock to
view occupants (illegal
immigration)
Fingerprinting in back
of police car
Search of
newspaper
office (picture)
Stopping
drivers at roadblock for
30-second
questioning
at night
(drunkenness)
Needle in
arm at work
to get blood
(drug usage)
Pat-down at
border (drugs
Looking through burned-down house (evidence of arson)
Obtaining a
voiceprint
Search of
house over
husband's
objection
when wife
gives consent (drugs)

116
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WITHOUT
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

WITH
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

S&S
M (SD)
(scale:
0–100)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

3

2.88 (1.03)

2.81 (1.49)

40

69.45
(33.16)

15

3

2.92 (1.38)

2.89 (1.28)

39

37.06
(29.55)

42

2

2.96 (1.48)

2.33 (1.27)

38

57.39
(31.11)

29

1

3.00 (1.13)

2.52 (1.28)

37

56.31
(31.42)

31

1

3.03 (1.27)

2.52 (1.31)

36

46.41
(31.19)

37

2

3.04 (1.45)

2.83 (1.34)

35

84.94
(22.19)

5

3

3.04 (1.37)

3.07 (1.24)

34

42.76
(38.70)

39

1

3.10 (1.23)

1.81 (1.08)

33

30.26
(30.85)

46

3

3.17 (1.17)

3.11 (1.28)

32

48.21
(31.74)

36

3

3.25 (0.94)

3.26 (1.23)

31

SAMPLE

n/a

116

n/a

The Randolph fact pattern was not included in Slobogin and Schumacher’s sample.
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STIMULUS
(context)
Inspecting
restaurant
kitchen(health code
violations)
Following
pedestrian
in police car
(determine
destination)
Search of
cornfields
surrounded
by fence and
No Trespassing signs
(marijuana)
Rummaging
through suitcase at airport (drugs)
Searching a
private junkyard (stolen
car parts)
Searching
yacht at sea
(drugs)
Searching
interior of
car on public highway
(weapons)
Searching a
garage (contraband)
Arrest, handcuffing,
and detention for 48
hours (rape
charges)
Searching
footlocker
found in car
(drugs)
Searching
mobile
home
(drugs)

357
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WITHOUT
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

WITH
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

S&S
M (SD)
(scale:
0–100)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

2

3.29 (1.18)

1.75 (1.52)

29

31.14
(28.15)

44

1

3.31 (1.37)

3.74 (1.16)

28

32.73
(39.85)

43

3

3.42 (0.93)

3.22 (1.25)

27

56.58
(28.99)

30

1

3.52 (1.09)

3.00 (1.14)

26

60.93
(27.72)

25

1

3.52 (1.15)

3.26 (1.02)

25

54.15
(29.04)

34

1

3.52 (1.15)

3.11 (1.28)

24

69.11
(24.75)

16

3

3.54 (1.02)

3.30 (1.10)

23

67.53
(26.33)

21

2

3.57 (1.00)

3.42 (1.06)

22

71.20
(22.41)

14

2

3.61 (1.55)

2.50 (1.62)

21

65.58
(24.84)

23

1

3.66 (0.77)

3.04 (1.02)

20

67.91
(28.47)

19

3

3.71 (1.04)

3.70 (1.17)

19

77.68
(21.04)

6

SAMPLE
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STIMULUS
(context)
Using a
beeper to
track car
(suspected
drug dealer)
Looking in
trunk of car
on public street (evidence of armed
robbery)
Searching a
6th grader’s
locker
(drugs)
Planting chauffeur as
undercover
agent (organized
crime)
Using secretary as undercover agent (organized crime)
Going through drawers at office
(evidence of
theft)
Searching
high school
kid's purse
(cigarettes)
Pat-down (at
airport after
terrorist
threat)
Search of a
college dormitory room
(drugs)
Watching
person in
front yard
with binoculars (see
who is
there)
Monitoring
a phone for
30 days
(gambling)
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WITHOUT
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

WITH
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

S&S
M (SD)
(scale:
0–100)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

3

3.88 (0.74)

3.48 (1.09)

17

54.46
(36.14)

33

1

3.93 (1.19)

3.41 (1.19)

16

67.20
(31.77)

22

2

3.93 (1.02)

3.67 (1.13)

15

60.32
(28.26)

26

2

3.96 (1.25)

3.50 (1.01)

14

67.56
(24.82)

20

2

3.96 (1.20)

3.63 (1.06)

13

68.98
(32.32)

17

3

3.96 (0.86)

3.81 (0.96)

12

63.11
(27.43)

24

1

4.00 (1.00)

3.33 (1.24)

11

75.14
(37.90)

10

2

4.00 (0.98)

2.54 (1.10)

10

54.76
(31.84)

32

2

4.04 (1.04)

3.71 (1.16)

9

76.13
(24.52)

8

3

4.17 (1.17)

3.81 (1.27)

8

68.63
(24.34)

18

2

4.21 (1.10)

3.58 (1.28)

7

87.67
(19.00)

2

SAMPLE
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STIMULUS
(context)

WITHOUT
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

WITH
CONTEXT
M (SD)
(scale: 1–5)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

S&S
M (SD)
(scale:
0–100)

OVERALL
RANK
(least to
most)

1

4.38 (0.94)

3.93 (1.30)

5

90.14
(18.18)

1

1

4.38 (1.01)

3.93 (1.27)

4

85.23
(18.45)

4

3

4.50 (0.66)

4.19 (1.00)

3

75.21
(22.78)

9

1

4.59 (0.57)

3.37 (1.31)

2

71.60
(24.81)

13

3

4.79 (0.41)

4.04 (1.02)

1

85.56
(20.73)

3

SAMPLE

Body cavity
search at
border
(drugs)
Search of a
bedroom
(money)
Tapping
into corporation's
computer
(fraud)
Perusing
bank records (illegal funds)
Reading a
personal
diary (embezzlement)

Table 2. R2 Fit Statistics for Each Stimuli Set.

STIMULI SET
2

1
WITHOUT
CONTEXT

WITH
CONTEXT

WITHOUT
CONTEXT

3

WITH
CONTEXT

WITHOUT
CONTEXT

WITH
CONTEXT

Dimension

R

R

R

R

R

R

1

0.566

0.547

0.571

0.499

0.556

0.44

2

0.739

0.736

0.783

0.634

0.635

0.648

3

0.853

0.827

0.899

0.793

0.745

0.784

4

0.889

0.896

0.931

0.848

0.841

0.851

5

0.925

0.929

0.96

0.931

0.853

0.903

6

0.936

0.943

0.969

0.953

0.902

0.931

2

2

2

2

2

2
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Table 3. Clusters for Stimuli with and without Context for Stimuli Set 1.

CLUSTER 1

WITHOUT CONTEXT

WITH CONTEXT

Searching a private junkyard (stolen
car parts)
Search of newspaper office (picture)

Searching a private junkyard (stolen
car parts)

Searching yacht at sea (drugs)
Looking in trunk of car on public
street (evidence of armed robbery)

CLUSTER 2

Looking in trunk of car on public
street (evidence of armed robbery)

Search of a bedroom (money)

Search of a bedroom (money)

Going through magnetometer at
airport (weapons)
Dog sniff of body (drugs)
Rummaging through suitcase at airport (drugs)
Searching high school kid's purse
(cigarettes)
Searching footlocker found in car
(drugs)
Boarding a bus and asking to search
luggage (drugs)
Body cavity search at border (drugs)

Going through magnetometer at
airport (weapons)
Dog sniff of body (drugs)
Rummaging through suitcase at airport (drugs)
Searching high school kid's purse
(cigarettes)
Searching footlocker found in car
(drugs)
Boarding a bus and asking to search
luggage (drugs)
Body cavity search at border (drugs)
Searching yacht at sea (drugs)

CLUSTER 3

CLUSTER 4

Following pedestrian in police car
(determine destination)

Following pedestrian in police car
(determine destination)

Stopping drivers at roadblock for 30second questioning at night (drunkenness)
Inspecting plumbing and wiring of
residence (damage)

Stopping drivers at roadblock for 30second questioning at night (drunkenness)
Inspecting plumbing and wiring of
residence (damage)

Looking through burned-down
house (evidence of arson)

Looking through burned-down
house (evidence of arson)

Perusing bank records (illegal
funds)

Perusing bank records (illegal
funds)
Search of newspaper office (picture)

Note: Items that are located in different clusters in the context condition are in bold.
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Table 4. Clusters for Stimuli with and without Context for Stimuli Set 2.
WITHOUT CONTEXT

CLUSTER 1

Inspecting kitchen of restaurant
(health code violations)
Looking in foliage at public park
(murder weapon)
Going through garbage in opaque
bags at curbside (forgery)
Searching a coal mine (safety violations)
Inspecting exterior of car in public
lot (blood stains)
Searching a college dormitory
(drugs)
Searching a garage (contraband)
Searching a 6th grader's locker
(drugs)
Pat-down (at airport after terrorist
threat)
Fingerprinting in police car (--)

WITH CONTEXT
Inspecting kitchen of restaurant
(health code violations)

Going through garbage in opaque
bags at curbside (forgery)
Searching a coal mine (safety violations)

Searching a college dormitory
(drugs)
Searching a garage (contraband)
Searching a 6th grader's locker
(drugs)
Pat-down (at airport after terrorist
threat)
Fingerprinting in police car (--)

Planting chauffeur as undercover
agent (organized crime)

CLUSTER 2

Using secretary as undercover agent
(organized crime)
Monitoring a phone for 30 days
(gambling)
Arrest, handcuffing, and detention
for 48 hours (rape charges)
Inspecting exterior of car in public
lot (blood stains)
Looking in foliage at public park
(murder weapon)

CLUSTER 3

Hospital surgery, shoulder (bullet)
Needle in arm at work to get blood
(drug usage)

Needle in arm at work to get blood
(drug usage)
Flying 400 yards over backyard in
helicopter (marijuana)

Flying 400 yards over backyard in
helicopter (marijuana)
CLUSTER 4

Monitoring a phone for 30 days
(gambling)
Planting chauffeur as undercover
agent (organized crime)

Using secretary as undercover agent
(organized crime)
Arrest, handcuffing, and detention
N/A
CLUSTER 5
for 48 hours (rape charges)
Hospital surgery shoulder (bullet)
Note: Items that are located in different clusters in the context condition are in bold.
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Table 5. Clusters for Stimuli with and without Context for Stimuli Set 3.

CLUSTER 1

CLUSTER 2

WITHOUT CONTEXT
Reading a personal diary (embezzlement)
Watching person in front yard with
binoculars (see who is there)
Search of cornfields surrounded by
fence and No Trespassing signs
(marijuana)

Using a beeper to track car (suspected drug dealer)
Tapping into corporation's computer (fraud)
Shining flashlight down dark alley
next to home (drug transaction)

Search of house over husband's objection when wife consents (drugs)
Searching drawers at office (theft)
Searching mobile home (drugs)

CLUSTER 3

WITH CONTEXT
Reading a personal diary (embezzlement)

Tapping into corporation's computer (fraud)
Obtaining a voiceprint (--)
Using a beeper to track car (suspected drug dealer)

Accompanying to urinal at work and
listening for urination (drug usage)
Questioning on public sidewalk for
10 minutes (determine destination)
Watching person in front yard with
binoculars (see who is there)
Search of house over husband's objection when wife consents (drugs)
Searching drawers at office (theft)
Searching mobile home (drugs)
Searching jail cell (conspiracy)
Searching bedroom of probationer
(illegal gun)
Searching interior of car on public
highway (weapons)
Search of cornfields surrounded by
fence and No Trespassing signs
(marijuana)
Shining flashlight down dark alley
next to home (drug transaction)
Pat-down at border (drugs)

Pat-down at border (drugs)
Searching jail cell (conspiracy)
Obtaining a voiceprint (–)
Questioning on public sidewalk for
10 minutes (determine destination)
CLUSTER 4
Searching bedroom of probationer
(illegal gun)
Searching interior of car on public
highway (weapons)
Stopping all drivers at roadblock to
Stopping all drivers at roadblock to
view occupants (illegal immigration)
view occupants (illegal immigration)
Accompanying to urinal at work and
CLUSTER 5
n/a
listening for urination (drug usage)
Note: Items that are located in different clusters in the context condition are in bold.
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Table 6. Significant Context Differences in Intrusiveness Ratings.

STIMULUS
Looking through
burned-down house
Perusing bank records
Inspecting kitchen of
restaurant
117
Pat-down
Reading a personal diary
Inspecting wiring and
plumbing of residence
Searching high school
kid’s purse
Searching footlocker
found in car
Inspecting exterior of car
in public lot
Arrest, handcuffing, and
118
detention for 48 hours
Rummaging through
119
suitcase at airport
Monitoring a phone for
30 days
Going through garbage
in opaque bags at curbside
Hospital surgery on
shoulder
Flying 400 yards over
backyard in helicopter

117

118

119

CONTEXT

EFFECT OF
CONTEXT ON

SIGNIFICANCE
LEVEL

(GOAL OF SEARCH)

INTRUSIVENESS
RATING

Evidence of arson

Lower

<.001

Illegal funds

Lower

<.001

Health code violations

Lower

<.001

At airport after terrorist threat
Embezzlement

Lower

<.001

Lower

.01

Damage

Lower

.011

Cigarettes

Lower

.031

Drugs

Lower

.013

Blood stains

Lower

.021

Rape charges

Lower

.015

Drugs

Lower

.089

Gambling

Lower

.062

Forgery

Lower

.09

Bullet

Lower

.086

Marijuana

Higher

.047

In Slobogin and Schumacher’s analysis, context lowered this stimulus’s intrusiveness rating substantially as well, from an overall ranking (out of 50) of 27 to an overall ranking of
9. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 192 tbl.2.
In Slobogin and Schumacher’s analysis, context lowered this stimulus’s intrusiveness rating substantially as well, from an overall ranking (out of 50) of 31 to an overall ranking of
26. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 192 tbl.2.
In Slobogin and Schumacher’s analysis, context elevated this stimulus’s intrusiveness rating substantially, from an overall ranking (out of 50) of 25 to an overall ranking of 33.
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 192 tbl.2.
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Figure 1. Scree plots for each set of stimuli of stress values for n-dimensions.
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Figure 2a. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 2 (Sample 1).

Figure 2b. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 3 (Sample 1).
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Figure 2c. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 2 and 3 (Sample 1).

Figure 3a. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 2 (Sample 2).
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Figure 3b. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 3 (Sample 2).

Figure 3c. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 2 and 3 (Sample 2).
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Figure 4a. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 2 (Sample 3).

Figure 4b. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 3 (Sample 3).
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Figure 4c. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 2 and 3 (Sample 3).

Figure 5a. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 2 (Sample 4).
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Figure 5b. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 3 (Sample 4).

Figure 5c. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 2 and 3 (Sample 4).
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Figure 6a. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 2 (Sample 5).

Figure 6b. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 3 (Sample 5).
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Figure 6c. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 2 and 3 (Sample 5).

Figure 7a. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 2 (Sample 6).
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Figure 7b. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 1 and 3 (Sample 6).

Figure 7c. Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 2 and 3 (Sample 6).
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